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I. Introduction 
The papers prepared for the Spring Review focused on a 
n~mber of interesting policy issues. Three of these appear to 
be of major importance. These are: (1) What are the payoffs 
to credit use at the farm level and how do technological barriers 
relate to these payoffs? (2) What are the impacts of credit 
policies, especially interest rates on the allocation of credit 
and the mobilization of savings? (3) What institutional forms 
should be used in credit delivery systems? 
These issues were extensively discussed and most of the 
pertinent questions have been raised in the papers prepared for 
the Spring Review. There is one dimension of small farmer credit 
programs, however, that was relatively neglected. This relates 
to the need for flexibility in credit programs. 
By flexibility, I wish to indicate that agricultural develop-
ment is a dynamic process involving many different decision units 
and that heterogeneity and change call for regular adjustments 
in development policies. Various phases of development present 
different demand and supply conditions for liquid resources. 
Furthermore, within a set of farms that appear to -Oe homogeneous 
in all respects, different farms can be in quite different phases 
of the development process. It follows then that no one set of 
inflexible credit policies, even when deemed appropriate for a given 
phase, would continue to be sufficient. I wish to illustrate this 
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point in greater detail with reference to the availability and 
adoption of 11new technologies" which often define the "precondi-
tions" for the success of small farmer credit programs °clS,25,3]. 
This issue of flexibility has not been neglected in the 
analytic papers [3,7,24]. On the contrary, a number of the credit 
programs cited reflect a concern for both the dynamics and 
heterogeneity of farm situations that characterize agricultural 
development experience in the LDC's. I wish to emphasize these and 
to argue that flexible policies are needed to respond to these 
differing farm situations and their continual change over time. 
II. Cross-Sectional Flexibility 
The authors of the papers under review1 indicate that there 
is a vast cross-sectional heterogeneity in farm characteristics 
from country to country, region to region, and even within a region 
that prevent easy generalizations. The importance for credit pro-
grams of farm level details needs to be reiterated. Factors such 
as farm size, type of enterprise, tenure conditions, degree of 
oligopoly in factor (especially capital) and product markets, the 
extent of subsistence production, and the degree of access to com-
mercial markets need to be carefully understood when designing 
farmer credit programs. This is particularly important when the 
focus is on rural families who may be located on subsistence farms. 
There is a growing concern that traditional economic theory 
which separates household decisions from firm decisions is inadequate 
in describing behavior of small subsistence farmers. These types 
of units allocate time between leisure and income, and income be-
tween current and future consumption (savings) and this allocation 
depends upon firm decisions to allocate resources between direct 
(current) and roundabout (future) means of production. This separa-
tion of the overall economic allocation problem into two parts--the 
household income allocation problem described by constrained utility 
maximization. and a firm resource allocation problem described by 
profit maximization and our research results based on this decomposi-
tion need to be carefully examined. This fundamental interdependence 
between firm and household decisions has long been recognized [12, 
16,20], but only recently has the importance of subsistence been 
1see bibliography that lists the analytic papers prepared for 
the Spring Review. 
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emphasized [26] and empirical studies have been designed to take 
its impact into account [14t4,8,6]. 
Much more work, both theoretical and empirical, needs to be 
done in this direction. This heterogeneity between farms with 
regard to the degree of subsistence is crucial to our understanding 
of the role of credit in small farmer programs because it deter-
mines the meaning and content of such concepts as "capital con-
straint," "absorbtive capacity for credit," and the "marginal pro-
ductivity of capital" and "productive vs. unproductive use of 
cap..1.tal, 11 so frequently used in credit analysis. 
To some extent there is an underlying awareness of the impor-
tance of 1subsistence [17] and cross-sectional farm level hetero-
geneity [1]. To be successful, small farmer credit programs should 
be flexible enough to meet the needs of the individual clientele. 
Markets are more capable of responding to heterogeneity, whereas 
institutional structures, unless especially designed to be flexible~ 
are not. The distinction is a bit artificial since perfect markets 
are really a form of fully adaptive and flexible institutions. 
In urging a greater need to strengthen and integrate capital 
markets, I may be bordering on a cliche. However, there is enough 
evidence to indicate that the failure of institutional sources of 
credit to displace the traditional non-institutional sources, even 
where interest differentials between these sources are large, is 
due in part to the ability of the latter to adjust to subsistence 
conditions and farm level heterogeneity. Thus, for example, insti-
tutional credit programs continue to differentiate between "pro-
ductive" and 11unproductive" uses of credit, encouraging the former 
with subsidies while attempting to deny the latter. This dubious 
distinction comes from our separation of firm from household de-
cisions in our models. In a subsistence household expenditures on 
maintenance of family labor, a crucial input into the firms pro-
duction process, should be viewed as necessary operating expenses 
for the firm. Surely, if the same farm were to hire labor, its 
cash payments would be considered a production not a consumption 
outlay worthy of credit support. Furthermore, unless all credit is 
tied to specific inputs, there is nothing to prevent farmers from 
using funds as they please. Even when "credit" is in physical inputs 
farmers have been known to sell them and use the proceeds as they 
see fit. Institutional credit programs then find that they have to 
11police" their loans. Non-institutional sources recognize these 
issues and often do not discriminate in this manner [3]. Similar 
inconguities arise when we eA:amine such factors as risk aversion, 
technological adjustment, and market response in the context of sub-
sistence [25). 
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A re-examination of our research tools and theories to take 
into account the real environment and its constraints as faced by 
small farmers is essential [9,10]. Such a need has already been 
recognized in a broader sense, as evidenced by the growing concern 
with "human capital," its content and impact on development. 
III. Flexibility over Time 
Further heterogeneity is introduced through time. Not only 
do farm characteristics differ substantially but they also change 
as different farms pass through different phases of development. 
A substantial part of the heterogeneity reflected in any observed 
cross-section is due to individual farms being in different phases 
of the "development process. 11 2 Clearly, the phases through which 
farms pass call for a flexibility over time in credit programs de-
signed to serve them. 
I wish to illustrate the idea of phases in the development 
process and the need for flexibility over time in credit programs 
by concentrating on the case where adoption of new technologies 
is an important factor in the strategy for agricultural development. 
For purposes of illustration, I distinguish three main phases--
before, during, and after the availability and adoption of new 
technologies. In doing so, I abstract both from situations where 
other avenues than a breakthrough in new technologies exist for 
rapid agricultural growth, as well as from other possible stages of 
development prior to and long after the new technologies have been 
adopted.3 
Phase I: Before the Introduction of New Technologies 
For convenience we consider this in terms of the "traditional 
equilibrium" as characterized by Schultz [22). The main characteristics 
21 wish to distinguish phases of "development" from the phases 
of the "farm life cycle" (i.e., establishment-expansion-consolidation-
demise) with which the word 11phase11 is usually associated in many 
studies. The distinction is not altogether clear as both phases are 
determined primarily by farm level investments (13]. 
31n this sense, we are concerned only with one stage--that is 
the availability of new technologies which has three phases. So, 
the focus is limited and more precise. 
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of this phase with a bearing on credit programs are: 
i) the state of the arts is constant; 
ii) the state of preference for holding and acquiring 
income streams are constant and stable; 
iii) the rates of returns to on-farm investments are so 
low that given (i) and (ii) there is an equilibrium 
in which, given the trade-off between current and 
future income streams, few additional investments 
are made and net savings are low. 
In addition, I wish to emphasize that rural capital markets 
may be highly fragmented with different farmers facing different 
rates of return on credit and savings [8). Therefore, we add the 
institutional characteristics of the rural credit market as follows: 
iv) rural capital markets are characterized by a high 
degree of oligopoly and differentiation, most of 
the supply of liquid funds is in the hands of non-
insti tutional lenders whose relationship with 
creditors is imbedded in a matrix of highly inter-
dependent socio-economic relationships. 
Phase II: Transitional - During the Adoption of New Techno-
logies 
This phase may be characterized by: 
i) dramatic breakthroughs in the state-of-the-arts 
associated with yield increasing and labor savings 
technologies; 
ii) a widespread dissemination and adoption of these 
technologies; 
iii) a dramatic and continuous change in the preferences 
and motives for acquiring new sources of incomes; 
iv) a discrete increase in the rates of returns to on-
farm investments such that given (i) through (iii), 
the trade-off between current and future income 
streams calls forth substantial demand for invest-
ment; 
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v) rural capital markets remain fragmented with con-
tinued elements of oligopoly and differentiation 
in the non-institutional sector and a high degree 
of homogeneity in the institutional sector [18 
21]. ' 
Phase III: Transitional - After the Adoption of New 
Technologies 
Although the detailed characteristics of this phase vary con-
siderably, its principle characteristics may be listed as follows: 
i) the near exhaustion of new on-farm investment oppor-
tunities with only marginally profitable technologies 
forthcoming; 
ii) a continuing change in the preferences and motives 
for acquiring new sources of income; 
iii) an advanced stage of commercialization of agriculture 
in both the input and output markets; 
iv) the introduction of a new set of consumer goods, and 
given (i) through (iii) a marked shift in the trade-
of f between current and future incomes in favor of 
current consumption; 
v) with the growing importance and dominance of institu-
tional credit, rural capital markets are integrated; 
and 
vi) a growing rural access to non-rural credit and in-
vestment opportunities and vice versa. 
I am aware that in describing these phases, we are open to all 
the criticisms leveled against stage theories. In particular, there 
are special problems in generalizing about the various characteristics 
in each phase, even if we were to agree on the phase sequence. In 
reality, some characteristics of one phase often appear in another, 
while the phases themselves cannot be discretely separated. In 
addition, some of the characteristics of phase three are more in 
the nature of conjecture rather than based on experience. 
Given these limitations, however, we can proceed to use these 
phases as an operational device with which to illustrate several 
arguments. The main point I want to make is that both the role and 
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the impact of small farmer credit programs depend on the phase in 
which the majority of small farmers are in, and that credit policies 
should be cognizant of this changing role and adapt accordingly. 
IV. The Market for Liquid Funds in Various Phases 
It is too complex a task to analyze the implications of the 
characteristics of each phase on the market for liquid funds. 
Such a fully articulated theory is beyond the scope of the current 
paper. The presentation below is therefore to be viewed as an 
attempt to initiate discussion on these complex issues. 
To see the implications of these phases in terms of the 
changing role and impact of credit programs, consider the market 
for "liquid funds 11 in which credit operates. The market for liquid 
funds is a larger concept than the market for investable funds, as 
we wish to include the consumption and production demands on 
liquidity. It is also broader than the market for loanable funds 
as we wish to include the farmers' own internal financial resources 
in addition to the supply from non-institutional and institutional 
sources. Therefore, we are concerned with the total demand and 
total supply of "liquidity" in various phases, whatever its source 
and whatever its use. 
Phase I 
In order to focus sharply on the comparative conditions of 
demand and supply, we further simplify by abstracting from the pro-
blems of the degree of fragmentation and the degrees of oligopoly 
in the rural capital markets and assume that farmers face money-
lenders who are monopolists in the non-institutional credit market. 
This situation in Phase I is illustrated in Figure I where the 
moneylenders equate marginal costs to marginal revenues, and the 
prevailing interest rate is r 0 , credit outstanding is F0 , and 
moneylender prof its are shown by the shaded area 
In examining the total demand and supply conditions there 
are three underlying assumptions behind Figure I: 
1) The total demand for liquid funds consists of two 
components--a demand on the part of the household for "consumption" 
requirements, often tied to subsistence or survival needs on small 
farms, as well as a demand by the firm for cash requirements for 
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essential inputs for current production. We assume the money-
lenders do not discriminate in extending credit between these two 
needs. 
I\ 
'Do I '~Hto 
0 Fo Liquid Funds. 
FIGURE I. The Market for Liquid Funds in Phase I. 
2) The supply of liquid funds also consists of two compo-
nents--the firm households' own internal funds and the external 
funds supplied by the moneylender. We assume that in this phase 
the internal supply of liquid funds is limited in relation to ex-
ternal funds. 
3) We assume that there are no institutional credit programs 
catering to the needs of the small farmers. 
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Now, let us examine the impact of institutional credit in 
this situation. To begin with let us assume that a fixed amount 
of institutional credit is introduced at rates slightly below 
moneylender interest rates. In such a case, the moneylenders 
become "residual suppliers, 11 that is, the demand curve facing them 
shifts backwards. Another way of showing the same effect is to 
shift the marginal cost curve outwards to MC1 by the same amount 




FIGURE II. The Market for Liquid Funds With 
With Institutional Credit in Phase I • 
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The impact is threefold: 
a) interest rates at which farmers can borrow are 
lowered from't'0 to1'1, for as total supply is in-
creased, moneylenders as re-residual suppliers face 
reduced demand schedules; 
b) the amount of credit outstanding in the system is 
increased from F0 to F1 and pari-pasu either more 
production or consumption needs are being met, and 
if investments are interest elastic, more is being 
invested; 
c) moneylenders monopoly prof its (shown by cross-hatched 
area"tf 1) are likely to be reduced even if demand is 
interest elastic, for a share of these profits are 
captured by the institutional credit agencies (the 
area with dots ) as moneylenders are assumed to be 
residual suppliers. 
To the extent that the primary goals of a small farmer credit 
program in phase I are i) to lower the interest rates at which 
farmers borrow for production and consumption needs, ii) to reduce 
the dependence of the farmers on the moneylender, and iii) to reduce 
moneylender monopoly profits and monopoly power, these goals are 
directly achieved. 
The extent to which these goals are achieved may be limited 
by institutional credit programs as presently conceived because 
they do not cater to the "consumption" needs of small farmers. In 
this case, the market discriminates by use and the moneylenders 
continue to provide consumption loans and continue to charge higher 
interest rates. Also, without the development of product markets, 
loan repayments are of ten in kind and the moneylenders continue to 
maintain their share of small farmer borrowing. These 11 tie-in11 
arrangements prevent small subsistence £armers from taking full 
advantage of institutional credit. 
In view of our earlier discussion about the nature of sub-
sistence and of firm-household decisions, it might be asked whether 
institutional credit should be restricted to narrowly conceived 
"productive" needs. If in fact it were possible to separate con-
sumption and production uses clearly, then separate and distinct 
markets could continue to cater to them. But an allocation of loans 
by use lends itself to a process of "internal arbitrage" wherein 
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funds are used for variously felt needs irrespective of the 
source. Part of the default problem may arise due to the fact 
that repayment schedules assume that credit tied to a given "pro-
ductive" use was actually so used.4 
But what are the alternatives? I wish to argue that if 
institutional credit has to be used, specifically, it must be 
tied to the effective dissemination and availability of new 
technologies. 
Before we turn to this issue, however, we should emphasize 
that one of the goals of small farmer programs should not be to 
peg interest rates below the market, for all this accomplishes 
is to create an excess demand for institutional credit. This can 
be seen in Figure II where attempcs to peg institutional rates of 
interest at r* (shown here as the rate that would prevail if there 
was perfect competition in capital markets) leads to an excess 
demand of E1 for institutional credit. 
There are three specific arguments against pegging interest 
rates far below the market rate: 1) low interest rates lead to 
excess demand and under these conditions, market discrimination 
gives way to non-market discrimination, usually to the disadvantage 
of small farmers who do not have access to political power and 
wealth [11]; 2) low interest rates prevent credit institutions 
from covering administrative costs, which are high for small farmers 
forcing them to give loans to a few low risk clients preventing 
their realization of economies of scales [5]; and 3) low interest 
rates capture a smaller share of moneylenders monopoly profits (thus, 
in Figure II the shaded area bounded by S1 to the left and between 
r* and rl continues to accrue to moneylenders). 
Phase II 
In phase two, both the demand and supply schedules shift out-
wards as shown in Figure III. The demand schedule shifts to D1, 
corresponding to a substantial upward shift in the marginal ef fi-
ciency of capital schedule occasioned by the introduction of new 
technologies. This shift is usually discrete and dramatic. Further, 
there is some evidence that at the prevailing interest rate r1, the 
demand becomes more interest inelastic [23). 
4Note that credit for 11consumption11 uses can also be produc-
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FIGURE III. The Market for Liquid Funds With Increasing 
Institutional Credit in Phase II • 
The supply schedule also shifts outwards to MC2 as internal re-
sources previously consumed or held in the form of near liquid 
assets are released. 
The reason for this increased flow of internal resources for 
production and investment use is that the trade-off between cur-
rent and future income streams has dramatically shifted against 
current consumption, even given the same rate of time preference. 
Thus, the introduction of new technologies with high payoffs are 
accompanied by increasing marginal propensities to save.5 
5The impact of dramatic shifts in the rates of return on house-
hold savings needs to be carefully researched. That these rates of 
return should be an argument in the consumption (savings) function 
has been argued by McKinnon (18], [19] and Adams and Singh [2]. 
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A part of the funds come from reduced consumption even at a "sub-
sistence level." 
Further financial resources are forthcoming from accumulated 
savings (wealth) over time from the funds that the firm household 
has set aside for "dire" emergency. For an idea of what constitutes 
a "dire" emergency, one needs to visit a road construction site in 
India where displaced, landless laborers and their wives and children 
work for a pittance, while their womenfolk wear heavy ornaments of 
silver. Households with some land to cultivate are even better otf, 
and gold and jewelry are family wealth hoarded sometimes over gen-
erations. But just as it is the last resource set aside for the 
most calamitous of emergencies, no peasant household will part with 
them for anything but the most assured and absolutely certain re-
turns. 
One cannot neglect the importance of internal savings material- 6 
izing in the most abject of conditions (e.g., Bangladesh and Zambia}. 
As a general rule, the higher and more certain the payoffs become, 
and the more reinforced the farmers experience in this regard, the 
larger the amount of internal resources forthcoming from reduced 
consumption and conversion of accumulated assets into liquidity for 
on-farm use. 
The impact on interest rates, in the absence of an expanding 
institutional credit program is to raise interest rates from r1 
to r 2 • This is because shifts in demand are likely to exceed any 
shifts in supply due to an increase in the availability of internal 
funds.7 
In phase two, the role of institutional credit programs 
should be: 
i} to provide increasing amounts of credit as demand 
increases after the initial adoption of new 
technologies; 
ii} to prevent interest rates from increasing and per-
haps even to lower them so that they do not become 
an initial barrier to the adoption of new techno-
logies. 8 
6see the Spring Review Country Papers on Bangladesh and Zambia. 
7see Singh and Day [23] for some evidence in this regard for 
the Indian Punjab. 
8we say initial 
new technologies have 
rates are unlikely to 
because there is some evidence that once 
proved their profitability, higher interest 
prevent their further adoption [23]. 
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iii) to blend in credit as a "package" with new 
technology--its knowledge, dissemination, avail-
ability of its inputs, its management and even 
assurance of markets for its output. 
iv) to help create more competitive conditions in 
local rural credit markets by setting up multiple 
credit, marketing and input supply agencies in 
the rural sector, and supplying credit through 
them. 
Thus, increasing institutional credit from S1 to S2 shifts 
the supply curve outwards to MC3, lowering interest rates to r3 
below previous levels at r1. In order to accomplish this institu-
tional credit must expand at a rate faster than demand.9 
Again, the result of pegging interest rates at say r* in 
Figure III means an excess demand of E2 for institutional credit, 
with all its attendant consequences. The inevitable result is 
that the discriminating role of the market is forfeited and re-
placed by other forms of non-market discrimination (18,21]. Other 
forms of non-market discrimination f 1nds its victims among the 
small and powerless. It is no mystery that under conditions of 
excess demand small farmers find little access to credit. No 
matter what the stated goals of the small farmer credit program, 
those without power will not be the ones to benefit. 
As stated most clearly in the paper by Gonzales-Vega (11), 
by not adapting the goals of the credit program to the changing 
demand situation brought about by theavailability of new high 
payoff technologies, most small farmer programs help to subvert 
their own goals. What is needed is a greater reliance on the mar-
ket at this point and the use of higher institutional interest 
rates as at r3 to ration the available credit. Precipitous changes 
in interest rates are to be avoided but by no means should credit 
programs continue to offer rates that are so low that access to 
credit becomes a function of rural power. 
Phase III 
In phase three, the demand for liquid funds continues to 
shift outwards to D2, and becomes more interest elastic over most 
of its range.10 This is shown in Figure IV. 
9Actually how much credit expansion is required to lower in-
terest rates is an empirical issue and specific to time and place. 





FIGURE IV. The Market for Liquid Funds With Diminishing 
Institutional Credit in Phase III. 
Furthermore, as new technologies bring higher returns and 
increased marketed surpluses, the internal cash flows within firm 
households increase substantially. Internal financial resources 
shift the supply schedule outwards substantially to MC4, lowering 
the market rate to r4· 
If market interest rates were maintained in phase two, and a 
multiple set of local credit and other agencies had been set up, 
they begin to mobilize rural savings by themselves. These savings 
come partly from the increased interest rates that were maintained 
earlier and partly from increased cash flows generated in firm 
households. The mobilization of these increased savings if combined 
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£ ll with an encouragement o competition destroys the monopoly nature 
of the informal credit market and interest rates fall further to 
rs as credit suppliers equate marginal costs to average (marginal) 
revenues (a move from A to B). We perceive monopolistic conditions 
in rural credit markets being reduced seriously only when a number 
of competing agencies provide credit access to small farmers and 
enough cash flows for these institutions are generated internally 
in the rural sector. 
Actually interest rates may not fall substantially if new con-
sumer goods are also introduced in rural markets. Consumption expenditures 
on bicycles, transistor radios and travel now lower the marginal 
propensity to save somewhat. New consumer goods and their demon-
stration effect change once again the trade-off between current and 
future income streams in favor of current consumption. In addi-
tion, once local credit agencies have begun to generate their own 
supply of funds, the special credit program now needs to be slowly 
phased out. A reduction of institutional credit from S2 to S3 com-
bined with an increased propensity to consume means that the supply 
schedule shifts back to MC5 with slightly higher interest rate at 
r6. (A shift from B to C.) 
Therefore, the role of small farmer credit programs in Phase 
III is: 
i) to encourage an increased proportion of the mar-
ginal cash flows generated in firm households to 
go into the self-financing of farm operations; 
ii) to encourage rural savings mobilization by pro-
viding appropriate interest rate and other in-
centives; 
iii) to encourage competition among local rural loan 
associations over which some control can be 
maintained by the ability of the credit program 
to re-finance their notes; 
iv) to encourage local rural loan associations to be-
come self-reliant so as to enable the credit pro-
gram to be eventually phased out as a growing and 
integrated rural capital market develops. 
llThat is competition amung local credit agencies through 
which the central credit agency supplies credit. 
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We wish to emphasize this last point, as no special credit 
program should become self-perpetuating. Its ability to phase 
itself out and become integrated into the regular financial 
system should be considered as the best evidence of its success. 
V. Summary 
We have attempted in this paper to indicate the need for 
flexibility in small farmer credit programs. A need for such 
flexibility is paramount both because of farm level heterogeneity 
and the dynamics of the demand for and supply of liquid funds in 
different phases of development. 
We have focused our attention on three technology phases. 
No doubt other phases could be used to make the same point: that 
the role and impact of small farmer credit programs depend on the 
phase in which the majority of small farmers are in, and that 
credit policies should be designed to be aware of their changing 
role and adjust accordingly. 
Just prior to the availability of new technologies the role 
of institutional credit is seen to be i) to lower interest rates, 
ii) reduce small farmer dependence on moneylenders and iii) to 
reduce moneylender monopoly profits. This can be achieved without 
resorting to subsidized credit, although a reluctance to provide 
credit for consumption needs may hamper the achievement of these 
goals. 
During the period of transition to the adoption of new techno-
logies, the main credit roles are seen to be i) to provide large 
amounts of credit as demand rises substantially and by so doing 
ii) prevent interest rates from increasing so that they do not 
become an initial barrier to the adoption of new technologies, iii) 
to tie credit to a package of new technologies and iv) to help 
institute a variety of local rural loan agencies to create competi-
tive conditions in rural capital markets. 
After the adoption of new technologies generates new cash 
flows in the rural sector, the role of the special credit program is 
i) to encourage credit institutions, ii) to mobilize these cash 
flows into financial savings, and iii) to make rural loan associations 
self-reliant by slowly phasing out the special programs and letting 
developing rural capital markets take over. 
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In no phase is the introduction of credit at subsidized rates 
seen to be beneficial to small farmers. Such subsidies create an 
excess demand for institutional credit with unfortunate consequences 
both from the point of the credit agency and of the small and 
under privileged who are supposed to be the main beneficiaries of 
such programs. Furthermore, a subsidy on credit brings about a 
greater eventual distortion in product and factor markets than 
specific product and factor subsidies. These distortions prevent 
rural credit markets from developing and their overall impact is 
to encourage the misallocation of scarce capital resources, often 
creating more problems than they were designed to solve. 
To conclude, both heterogeneity across farms as well as the 
additional heterogeneity introduced through time as farms develop 
calls for a continually adjustable and flexible response in the 
rural financial sector. Credit programs can be partly designed to 
take this into account but a greater reliance on developing finan-
cial markets seems to be a more efficient way of meeting this pro-
blem. 
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